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1
 On the role of product market power on unionization, see among others Layard er alii (1991). 
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 Detailed results ara available at www.worldbank.org; see also Upham (1995). 
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 In that case, the super monopoly price is a punishment less severe than the shut-down solution, since the 
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 Following Laffont and Tirole (1986), one can extend our analysis by considering a general  production function 
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 In this paper, we consider a control mechanism based on the output because the input is not supposed observed. 
Further , Maskin ans Riley (1984) have shown the superiority of the relation based on the output level for a 
monopolist firm. 
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 Let us recall that the reservation payoff of the monopolistic firm i s set to zero. 
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 From the definition of the rent value, it is an increasing function of the produced  ouput  .Q .  
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 When social planner chooses to reduce the level of the output, a monopolist firm of type   finds it less 
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 When the parameter  is such that 1 , we note that the regulator is indifferent with respect to the 
distribution of the rent between the firm and the labot union.  
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